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Perceived control in contingency learning is linked to psychological wellbeing with low
levels of perceived control thought to be a cause or consequence of depression and
high levels of control considered to be the hallmark of mental healthiness. However,
it is not clear whether this is a universal phenomenon or whether the value that
people ascribe to control influences these relationships. Here we hypothesize that
values affect learning about control contingencies and influence the relationship between
perceived control and symptoms of mood disorders. We tested these hypotheses with
European university samples who were categorized as endorsing (or not) values relevant
to control—individualist and collectivist values. Three online experimental contingency
learning studies (N1 = 127, N2 = 324, N3 = 272) were carried out. Evidence
suggested that individualist values influenced basic learning processes via an effect
on learning about the context in which events took place. Participants who endorsed
individualist values made control judgments that were more in line with an elemental
associative learning model, whilst those who were ambivalent about individualist values
made judgments that were more consistent with a configural process. High levels
of perceived control and individualist values were directly associated with increased
euphoric symptoms of bipolar disorder, and such values completely mediated the
relation between perceived control and symptoms. The effect of low perceived control
on depression was moderated by collectivist values. Anxiety created by dissonance
between values and task may be a catalyst for developing mood symptoms. Conclusions
are that values play a significant intermediary role in the relation between perceived
control and symptoms of mood disturbance.
Keywords: perceived control, contingency judgment, depression, bipolar disorder, illusion of control, outcome
density, individualism, collectivism
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Introduction
People who feel “in control” of their lives tend to be healthier
than those who feel that they are helpless to affect change (e.g.,
Seligman, 1975; Taylor and Brown, 1988). Whilst this statement
is sometimes accepted without question, there is good reason to
question its veracity (e.g., Yamaguchi et al., 2008; Cheng et al.,
2013) because people’s differing values shape the interpretation
of their experiences (Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1996;
Green et al., 2005). It is therefore important to understand how
values intervene in the relation between perceived control and
symptoms of psychopathology. Here we report on a series of
three experiments that were carried out to this end. First, we
describe robust methods of studying perceived control, evidence
of judgment bias and links to symptomatology, before discussing
the intervening role of values.
Perceived Control and Contingency Judgments
Different methods have been used to study perceived control
and the relation to mental health (e.g., contingency judgements,
Alloy and Abramson, 1979; predictions of random events, Fast
et al., 2009; chance and skill tasks, Langer, 1975) in order to
address whether people’s judgments are an accurate reflection of
their experiences. However, in order to determine accuracy, the
method used must provide an objective measure of experienced
control. Contingency judgment methods provide such a measure
(Dobson and Franche, 1989).
In a standard contingency task, participants are asked to
perform actions that may or may not result in an outcome
(e.g., button press, light flash). After numerous such experiences,
participants rate their own control over the outcome using a
numeric scale (e.g., +100 complete control, 0 no control, −100
completely prevent). The experimenter can program the
contingency between action and outcome, which can be defined
by the four possible action-outcome conjunctions shown in
Table 1, and compare it to participants’ ratings for accuracy.
1P (delta P) is the most appropriate measure of the
contingency between binary events (Allan, 1980) and
is calculated as 1P = p(outcome|action) - p(outcome|no
TABLE 1 | Examples of the frequencies of stimulus conjunctions, including action, outcome and context, which can be used to calculate 1P in conditions
with no control and a low (0.25|0.25) and high (0.75|0.75) density of outcomes.
Stimuli present in the learning scenario Action—outcome conjunctions Condition
Action Outcome Context 0.25 | 0.25 0.75 | 0.75
+ + + A 5 15
+ − + B 15 5
− + + C 5 15
− − + D 15 5
p(outcome|action) = p(O|A) A/A+B 0.25 0.75
p(outcome|no action) = p(O|∼A) C/C+D 0.25 0.75
Outcome density = p(outcome) (A+C)/(A+B+C+D) 0.25 0.75
1P = p (O|A) − p(O|∼A) (A/(A+B)) − (C/(C+D)) 0 0
+ Indicates the occurrence of a stimulus, whereas − indicates its absence.
action). 1P is a value that varies between +1 (a perfect positive
contingency, complete control), through zero (no control) to−1
(actions prevent the outcome occurring). This scale, like the
judgment scale described above, is continuous with opposite
upper and lower bounds (−100 and +100 for judgment scales,
and −1 and +1 for 1P). Note that the experimental setting or
context can also be thought of as a stimulus and reference to
this is included in Table 1. This is because in order to assess
their control, people must also attend to events that are outside
their control and occur randomly in the same context. Thus
experimental studies often require that participants rate their
own control over the outcome and that of the context so this
aspect of learning can be studied (e.g., Msetfi et al., 2013).
Judgment Bias and Wellbeing
Judgments of control are sensitive to quite subtle changes in 1P
and people tend to recognize when their actions do and do
not have control over outcomes (e.g., Wasserman et al., 1993).
A detailed review of these studies is outside the scope of this
paper. However, several key findings are particularly relevant.
The first finding is that when participants are exposed to
conditions like those in Table 1, which have the same zero level
of contingency but a different density of outcomes occurring
over time, judgments tend to be higher when outcomes occur
frequently (0.75|0.75 condition). With infrequently occurring
outcomes, judgments are closer to zero and more consistent
with 1P (e.g., Allan and Jenkins, 1980, 1983; Dickinson et al.,
1984). This difference in judgments between the two conditions
is known as the “outcome density effect” (for a discussion see
Allan, 1993) but is also referred to as the “illusion of control” (e.g.,
Alloy et al., 1981; Matute, 1996; Blanco et al., 2011). The illusion
of control refers to the observation that while the objective
contingency is zero, participants feel that they have at least a
moderate degree of control over the outcome. This finding has
been influential in terms of theoretical developments in the
field of human contingency judgments, leading to the search for
the “best” rule to describe such systematic departures from the
normative1P, though often leading to the conclusion that simple
associative processes provide the best account (Allan, 1993).
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The second key finding to note here is that illusory control
or outcome density effects are not evident for people with mild
depression. For example, Alloy andAbramson (1979), and others,
presented non-depressed and mildly depressed participants with
the conditions described in Table 1. Non-depressed participants
showed the outcome density effect, whereas those who were
mildly depressed did not. In fact, overall, their control judgments
were closer to the objective contingency programmed by the
experimenter. This finding was labeled “depressive realism” with
the implication that the depressed recognized their lack of control
because it was consistent with motivational and negative bias
aspects of depression (Ackermann and DeRubeis, 1991; Haaga
and Beck, 1995; Moore and Fresco, 2012). Thus, illusory control
was conceived as evidence of healthy biases and optimism,
serving as a protective factor for mental healthiness (Taylor and
Brown, 1988). We should note here that an associative analysis
has also been useful in explicating the effects of psychopathology
on these basic cognitive processes, providing explanations for
changes in the psychological mechanisms underlying perceived
control when people experience disorders like depression (see for
example, Haselgrove and Hogarth, 2012). Later on in this paper,
we too will utilize the associative framework in our discussion of
the findings as we have done elsewhere (Msetfi et al., 2005).
Perceived Control and Values
The traditional interpretation of the relation between perceived
control and depression symptoms is based on the importance
that is ascribed to “being in control.” In other words, feeling
“in control” is psychologically valued to the extent that
healthy people will such protect such feelings in the face
of an uncontrollable situation (Alloy and Tabachnik, 1984).
Conversely, the healthy bias is either absent (realism) or a
negative bias is present either as a cause or a consequence of
depression. Thus, control is of such psychological value that its
absence is correlated with psychological disorder (Langer, 1975;
Seligman, 1975). However, it is not clear whether the presence
or absence of control would be psychologically ‘threatening’ if
control were less valued.
Other work has explored these ideas using values associated
with different cultural perspectives as an instance of between
groups differences in values. One frequently made distinction
is that of individualist vs. collectivist values (Hofstede, 1980;
Triandis, 1996). Individualism, linked to Western culture, is
associated with viewing the self as independent, with clear
value placed on having personal goals and personal control.
Collectivism tends to be related to Eastern culture in which the
self is viewed as interdependent; value is placed on community
and group goals. This simplistic description suggests that cultural
distinctions are very clear cut when they are not (Cooper and
Denner, 1998; Triandis and Gelfand, 1998; Green et al., 2005). It
does suggest, however, that the importance and value placed on
personal control is not universal (Markus and Kitayama, 1991)
with corresponding implications for mental health. Moreover,
interpretations of findings, in terms of optimistic illusory control
and depressive realism, may not generalize to people with a
different set of values.
Experimental work has shown that culture does influence
learning about contingencies. For example, judgments made
by Chinese and American students tested at an American
university were different, though the nature of the difference
was task dependent (Ji et al., 2000). When the task concerned
passively experienced predictive contingencies, Chinese students’
judgments tended to be higher than American students’
judgments. No differences were observed in a subsequent task
involving control contingencies. These findings are consistent
with the idea that values affect contingency learning. However,
that study was not designed to explore the relation between
perceived control and mood, so further study is certainly
required.
Although cross-cultural comparisons have been useful in
identifying differences in contingency judgments, and other
cognitive processes, this methodology may not be the best tool to
address the questions we are interested in. There is considerable
variability in the extent to which particular values are endorsed
within specific settings. For example, there are differences
between Scandinavian, British and US individualism (Triandis
and Gelfand, 1998) and people can be both individualistic and
collectivistic at the same time (Green et al., 2005). Moreover,
globalization, demographic change and immigration create
considerable diversity within settings and ethnic groups that
might have previously been considered to be culturally uniform
(Cooper and Denner, 1998). This variability points toward the
importance of studying the effects of values on perceived control
within cultural settings.
Therefore, we proposed to use the constructs of individualism
and collectivism in order to identify the values held by our
participants that are relevant to perceived control, and conduct
our tests within a European setting. First, we planned to test
whether such values have an effect on contingency learning in
a similar manner to cross cultural differences (Ji et al., 2000).
However, we also planned to test the effects of values on illusory
control effects specifically because the absence of this effect is
linked to depression (Alloy and Abramson, 1979). Thus, the
first hypothesis was that (1) self-reported individualistic and
collectivistic values will influence illusory control effects on
contingency judgments. People with highly individualist values
will value control to the extent that they evidence a stronger
illusory control effect (greater difference between low and high
density conditions) than those endorsing low individualist or
collectivist values who value personal control to a lesser degree.
The second (2) hypothesis was that the relationship between
contingency judgments and measures of mood state would
depend on individualist and collectivist values. This hypothesis
can be tested in two ways. The first is a moderation hypothesis
(2a) in that “values” constitute variables which affect the direction
or strength of the relation (Baron and Kenny, 1986) between
perceived control and symptoms. In other words, those who
experience a high level of control and value control, and those
who experience low levels of control but don’t value it, will
experience lower levels of symptoms. However, where there
is dissonance between experienced control and values there
will be higher levels of symptoms. However, it is also possible
that values mediate the relation between perception of control
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and symptoms. As Baron and Kenny argue, mediator variables
explain how external events take on psychological significance
(p. 1174) and provide an explanation for the relation. Thus we
also plan to test the hypothesis (2b) that the relation between
perceived control and symptoms is mediated by endorsed values.
These hypotheses were tested using a standard contingency
learning task presented online in order to achieve the large
sample size and adequate power. Variations in mood were
measured in several different ways. Depressed mood has been
repeatedly linked to low levels of perceived control (Seligman,
1975; Alloy and Abramson, 1979). We also measured the
symptoms of bi-polar disorder, which is a mood disorder
characterized by episodes of depression and elation. Bipolar
disorder is pertinent here as it has been linked to high levels of
perceived control, goal directed over-activity and optimism about
the likelihood of producing outcomes (Langer, 1975). Consistent
with this, induced elated mood has been shown to produce high
levels of perceived control in depressed participants (Alloy et al.,
1981).
Experiment 1
Method
Participants
Following approval from the Faculty Ethics committee (Approval
number: EHSREC10-107), participants were recruited through
the email systems of the University of Limerick in the Republic
of Ireland. The survey remained open until no responses had
been received for 2 weeks. Whilst 257 participants entered
the online survey, 127 (49 males and 78 females) completed
all questionnaires and the contingency learning task and were
included in the data analyses. Of the final sample, 106 participants
self-reported as white or white Irish, the remaining (n = 21) were
of Asian or mixed origins. All participants declared their place of
birth to be a Western country (e.g., Ireland, UK, USA, Australia,
Europe), except one, who reported Japan as their place of birth.
Participants were on average 22 years old (M = 22.39, SE =
0.63) with 15 years of full time education (M = 15.03, SE =
0.20). Scores on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI: Beck et al.,
1961) and the Mood Disorders Questionnaire (MDQ: Hirschfeld
et al., 2000), were in the expected range (RangeBDI = 0–50,
MBDI = 9.55, SEBDI = 0.82; RangeMDQ = 0–13,MMDQ = 5.62,
SEMDQ = 0.31). Average horizontal and vertical individualism
scores were 10.52 (SE = 0.41) and 16.43 (SE = 0.48),
respectively, whereas horizontal and vertical collectivism scores
were 10.74 (SE = 0.37) and 11.37 (SE = 0.45), respectively.
Design
Two quasi-experimental designs were used in this study.
The first involved two between groups independent variables:
collectivism (low, high) and individualism (low, high). Two
repeated measures variables were also manipulated, outcome
density (OD: low 0.25, high 0.75 see Table 1), and cue (action,
context). The latter variable refers to whether participants were
rating their own control over the outcome via the action or
the control exerted by the context. The dependent variable was
ratings of control. This yielded a mixed fully factorial 2 × 2 ×
(2 × 2) design. The power analysis showed that for a medium
effect, f = 0.25 and alpha = 0.05, this design requires N = 116
to achieve a power of 0.80. Order of condition presentation was
counterbalanced.
The second part of this study involved ratings of control in the
high OD condition in which healthy people tend to over-estimate
their control and people with depression do not. In order to
test Hypothesis 2a, we categorized participants as making low
or high control judgments (see Data Analysis Section). Along
with the other between groups variables, individualism (low,
high) and collectivism (low, high), this yielded a fully factorial
2 × 2 × 2 design. The power analysis showed that for a medium
effect, f = 0.25 and alpha = 0.05, this design requires N =
128 to achieve a power of 0.80. The aim of this was to assess
whether the relationship between pre-existing tendencies toward
low or high judgments of control and measures of mood state
(BDI, MDQ) is affected by the endorsement of specific values.
The final aspect of this design was correlational. Again, this
specifically explored judgments of control in the high outcome
density zero contingency condition only. The aim was to assess
the extent to which any relationships between judgments of
control and measures of mood related symptoms were mediated
by endorsement of values.
Measures
Contingency task
The experimental task was programmed using java based code
hosted at JudgementExperiment.com and presented using any
standard web browser.
Beck depression inventory (Beck et al., 1961)
The BDI is a self-report measure of depressed mood used with
both clinical and student populations (Bumberry et al., 1978).
Each of the 21-items includes statements relevant to depression
(e.g., I do not feel like a failure, I feel I am a complete failure as a
person) scored up to a value of 3. Total scores can range from 0
to 63 with higher scores indicating higher levels of depression.
The mood disorder questionnaire (Hirschfeld et al., 2000)
The MDQ is a self-report questionnaire designed to be used as a
screening tool for bipolar disorder. There are 13 items related to
symptoms of mania that can be answered yes or no, with a yes
answer yielding a score of 1. Subsequent questions then enquire
about the frequency and significance of the consequences of the
itemsmentioned previously. Only the initial 13 items were scored
and summed to produce a total score as in other studies that used
a general population sample (Dodd et al., 2010).
The individualism and collectivism scale (IC: Triandis
and Gelfand, 1998)
The original scale included 32 self-report items on the
endorsement of individualist and collectivist values. Here,
we used the 16 items that have previously been found to
have the highest factor loadings. There are four subscales—
Horizontal Individualism (HI), Vertical Individualism (VI),
Horizontal Collectivism (HC), and Vertical Collectivism (VC),
where horizontal dimensions emphasize equality and vertical
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subscales emphasize hierarchy. People with a more prominent
HI pattern value self-reliance and uniqueness, whereas those
for whom VI is more prominent are more likely to place value
on distinctiveness and high status. People who endorse more
HC items value interdependence, sociability, and shared aims.
Vertical collectivists strongly emphasize the importance of in-
group integrity even at the cost of their own interests. Ratings
were made on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 indicating “strongly
disagree” to 7 indicating “strongly agree,” with a possible range of
4–28 for each subscale. Reliability was found to be at acceptable
to good levels, with Cronbach’s alpha calculated as α = 0.77, 0.76,
0.75, and 0.82 for the HI, VI, HC, and VC scales, respectively.
Procedure
Participants clicked on a link in an email and were taken
to the online questionnaires and experimental task. After
giving informed consent, participants were asked to provide
demographic information, including age, gender, education,
ethnic origin, nationality and country of birth. Then the BDI,
MDQ, and IC scales were completed, in the same order for all
participants, followed by the contingency task. The instructions
informed participants that we are working on developing an
online game and that we are interested in trying to understand
levels of control in the way that people play all the different
aspects of the game. In this particular test, participants would
enter the “game testing room” and would be asked to try to
make a ping sound occur on the computer inside the room (see
Appendix 1 in Supplementary Material) by pressing the spacebar
on the keyboard when signaled to do so by the appearance of a
blue triangle on the computer screen. Each condition included
40 trials composed of a 1s response time window during which
the blue triangle appeared on the screen. This was followed by
the ping sound lasting for 0.5s at a probability of 0.75 following
a response and a probability of 0.75 following no response in the
high OD condition. In the low OD condition both probabilities
were 0.25. Each trial was separated from the next by a 2s inter-
trial interval during which the game testing room was visible
on the computer screen. Following each condition, participants
would be asked to make a judgment of their own control over
the ping sound using the space bar, and then on the next screen
a judgments about the control that the context (room, computer
console etc.) exerted over the ping. Both judgments were made
on a slider, which produced ratings that varied from 100 (total
control) through 0 (no control) to −100 (totally prevent). On
initial view, the “start position” of the slider was not shown; it
only appeared once the participant had clicked into the slider
to indicate the position on the scale of the final judgment. This
was to ensure that the initial positioning of the slider did not
bias participants’ ratings. The full text of the instructions and
the judgment screens is shown in Appendix 2 of Supplementary
Material. Following completion of both conditions, participants
were redirected to a thank you screen containing debriefing
information and links to support information.
Data Analysis
Three sets of analyses were conducted. The first analysis was
designed to test whether the size of illusory control effects,
the difference in judgments between the two OD conditions,
varied as a function of individualistic and collectivistic values.
We planned to categorize participants as low or high scorers
on the IC scale. However, scores on the individualism and
collectivism subscales were significantly positively correlated,
r(125) = 0.29, p = 0.001 (see Table A3.1 in Supplementary
Material). This is not unusual and most agree that individualism
and collectivism are not mutually exclusive (Green et al., 2005).
Only scores on the vertical individualism (VI) and horizontal
collectivism (HC) sub-scales were uncorrelated, r(125) = 0.02,
p = 0.82. We therefore used median splits on these
subscales (VI median = 16, HC median = 10) in order to
categorize participants, using the assumption that a low score
represented lack of endorsement of the value rather than
disagreement. This resulted in groups labeled: low individualist—
low collectivist (n = 28); low individualist—high collectivist
(n = 34), high individualist—low collectivist (n = 30);
and high individualist—high collectivist group (n = 35).
These group classifications were used as the between subjects
variables.
The second analysis (Hypothesis 2a) was to test whether values
moderated the relation between low and high control judgments
and mood symptoms. To this end, we performed a median
split on the judgment of control data in the high OD condition
(median= 3) yielding a low control group (n = 65,M = −12.74,
SE = 3.36) and a high control group (n = 62, M = 43.16,
SE = 3.13). The final analysis was used to test Hypothesis 2b
on the mediating role of values. The second set of analyses was
intended to assess whether culturemediated any relation between
control judgments and measures of psychopathology (mood).
We used a non-parametric bootstrapping procedure (Preacher
and Hayes, 2008), which estimates the indirect effects of multiple
mediator variables, and in this case was based on 1000 bootstrap
resamples with 95% bias corrected confidence intervals. These
analyses were used to test the extent to which culture mediated
the relation between contingency judgments of measures of
psychopathology.
Results and Discussion
Participants completed a contingency judgment task in which
they assessed their own control (action) and that of the
context over the occurrence of an auditory outcome. These
data were analyzed in relation to the two hypotheses and
an alpha level of 0.05 was used throughout unless stated
otherwise.
Hypothesis 1: Illusory Control Effects are Influenced
by Values
Mean ratings of perceived control are shown in Figure 1 for the
low and high individualist groups only (collectivism had no effect
on judgments).
Key effects (see ANOVA Table 2) are that high outcome
density ratings were higher than low outcome density ratings and
that action ratings were significantly lower than context ratings.
Both main effects were qualified by a significant cue × density
interaction and a cue × density × individualism interaction.
The simple interactions showed that high individualists’ ratings
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FIGURE 1 | Action and context ratings as a function of low and high outcome density condition and low or high individualist groups. Error bars
correspond to the standard errors of the mean.
TABLE 2 | Analysis of variance for judgments of control in Experiment 1
(Hypothesis 1).
Source F η2 P
WITHIN SUBJECTS EFFECTS
Cue 23.03 0.162 <0.001
Cue × VI 3.56 0.029 0.062
Cue × HC 0.96 0.008 0.329
Cue × Gender 3.20 0.026 0.076
Cue × VI × HC 0.06 <0.001 0.815
Cue × VI × Gender 1.64 0.014 0.203
Cue × HC × Gender 0.61 0.005 0.438
Cue × VI × HC × Gender 1.53 0.013 0.219
Error (Cue) (1761.96)
Density 8.60 0.067 0.004
Density × VI 2.30 0.019 0.132
Density × HC 1.25 0.01 0.265
Density × Gender 0.22 0.002 0.642
Density × VI × HC 1.05 0.009 0.307
Density × VI × Gender 0.98 0.008 0.325
Density × HC × Gender 0.11 0.001 0.742
Density × VI × HC × Gender 0.01 <0.001 0.93
Error (density) (682.18)
Cue × Density 10.69 0.082 0.001
Cue × Density × VI 4.66 0.038 0.033
Cue × Density × HC 1.01 0.008 0.317
Cue × Density × Gender 0.32 0.003 0.576
Cue × Density × VI × HC 3.12 0.026 0.08
Cue × Density × VI × Gender 5.11 0.041 0.026
Cue × Density × HC × Gender 1.32 0.011 0.253
Cue × Density × VI × HC × Gender 0.50 0.004 0.482
Error (Cue × Density) (1166.67)
(Continued)
TABLE 2 | Continued
BETWEEN SUBJECTS EFFECTS
VI 11.64 0.089 0.001
HC 0.038 <0.001 0.845
Gender 2.972 0.024 0.087
VI × HC 0.015 <0.001 0.903
VI × Gender 1.946 0.016 0.166
HC × Gender 0.039 <0.001 0.843
VI × HC × Gender 0.108 0.001 0.743
Error (2425.251)
This was 2 × 2 × 2 × (2 × 2) mixed factorial analysis of variance, with individualism (VI:
low, high) and collectivism (HC: low, high) entered as between subjects factors, and Cue
(action, context) and outcome density (low, high) entered as repeated measures factors.
Gender was also included in the analysis as a between subjects factor. Mean squared error
values are shown in parentheses. Bold indicates significant effects. Degrees of freedom=
1, 119.
strongly distinguished between action and context, F(1, 61) =
24.10, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.28, and this effect was weaker
for low individualists, F(1, 58) = 4.59, p = 0.04, η
2
=
0.07. For high individualists, there was a significant outcome
density × cue interaction, F(1, 61) = 15.23, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.20, but not for low individualists, F < 1. This
showed that, for high individualists, their discrimination between
action and context was present only in low outcome density
conditions, and their action ratings increased significantly with
higher levels of outcome density, high OD > low OD: p <
0.001. This was not the case for low individualists, p = 0.28.
However, it is also important to note the presence of a cue ×
density × individualism × gender interaction. Further analysis
showed that, in contrast to all other groups, low individualist
male participants action ratings were un-affected by outcome
density, p = 0.86, η2 = 0. These findings are generally
consistent with our hypothesis that those who valued control
would show larger illusory control effects than those who value
it less.
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FIGURE 2 | Mean BDI (left) and MDQ scores (right) as a function of perceived control, individualist and collectivist values. Error bars represent the
standard error of the mean.
Hypothesis 2a: Values Moderate the Relation
between Perceived Control and Symptoms
BDI andMDQ scores are shown in Figure 2 as a function of high
and low perceived control and high and low values endorsement.
Figure 2 suggests, contrary to our expectations, that high
control participants experience higher levels ofmood disturbance
symptoms. However, the ANOVA showed there were no reliable
effects on BDI scores (Table 3) but that high individualists
produced higher MDQ scores than low individualists.
Hypothesis 2b: Values Mediate the Relation between
Perceived Control and Symptoms
The mediation models with BDI scores and MDQ scores as the
outcome variables are shown in Figure 3, with significant direct
pathways signified by solid lines and non-significant pathways
signified by broken lines.
This analysis showed that the direct relationship between
control rating and BDI scores was not reliable, β = 0.01, p = 0.66,
however, the indirect pathway through HC scores was reliable
at the 95% confidence level, β = −0.008 [−0.03, −0.001].
Thus while lower levels of perceived control were associated with
higher levels of depression, this was completelymediated through
higher endorsement of collectivist values.
The direct relationship between control ratings and MDQ
scores was not reliable, β = 0.02, p = 0.16. However, the indirect
pathway from control through VI to MDQ scores was reliable
at the 95% confidence level, β = 0.005 [0.001, 0.01]. This was a
complete mediation effect, and shows that higher levels of judged
control predict higherMDQ scores and bipolar symptomatology,
through lower endorsement of VI values.
Overall, Experiment 1 provided some evidence for the effects
of values on contingency learning and symptoms. Individualism
affected the size of illusory control effects and the extent to which
TABLE 3 | Analysis of variance on depression and bipolar scores in
Experiment 1 (Hypothesis 2a).
Source Dependent variable: Dependent variable:
BDI MDQ
F η2 p F η2 p
Control 1.72 0.014 0.193 1.44 0.012 0.233
VI 0.45 0.004 0.505 4.68 0.038 0.033
HC 3.45 0.028 0.066 1.12 0.009 0.292
Control × VI 0.23 0.002 0.630 0.24 0.002 0.624
Control × HC 1.68 0.014 0.197 3.91 0.032 0.050
VI × HC 0.04 <0.001 0.837 0.10 0.001 0.747
Control × VI× HC 0.24 0.002 0.624 0.06 0.001 0.807
Error (−84.19) (−11.81)
These were 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVAs with individualist (VI: Low High), collectivist (HC: Low,
High) and Control (Low, High) as between subjects factors. Mean square error values are
shown in parentheses. Bold indicates significant effects. Degrees of freedom = 1, 119.
people distinguished between their own control and that of the
context. The analysis of depression symptoms was consistent
across moderator and mediator analyses, no direct relation was
evident between control and BDI scores. However, consistent
with that, the mediation analysis suggested that HC values
completely mediate the pathway between perceived control and
depression symptoms. In addition, both the moderation and
mediation analysis suggested that people with more individualist
values tended to report higher levels of bipolar symptoms. The
mediation analysis showed that judged control predicted bipolar
symptoms via the value ascribed to that control. These findings
provide support for the hypothesis that values are part of the
psychological mechanism throughwhich varying levels of control
lead to mood disturbance.
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FIGURE 3 | Values as a mediator of the relationship between judgment of control and measures of (A) depression and (B) bi-polar symptoms.
Significant indirect pathways are emphasized with gray shading. Ninety-five percentage confidence limits around the indirect effects are shown in brackets.
The final sample of N = 127 was sufficient to detect medium
effect sizes in the basic design with 80% power suggesting that
the study was adequately powered. However, the sample lacked
diversity and perhaps sufficient variability in values as only
16.5% of the final sample self-categorized as other than white
or white Irish. Therefore, in the next experiment we aimed to
replicate and extend the findings with a larger but more diverse
sample.
In addition, in Experiment 1, we collected data on depression
levels using the BDI.Whilst this is reliable measure of depression,
BDI scores are also strongly correlated with levels of stress
and anxiety (Lovibond and Lovibond, 1995), which can be a
confound. Therefore, in Experiment 2, we chose to measure
depression using an alternative self-report scale that distinguishes
between depression, anxiety and stress.
Experiment 2
In this experiment, we used the same procedure as the previous
experiment to collect data from a larger, more diverse sample
as well as using a measure of depression which distinguished
between depression and correlates such as anxiety and stress.
Method
Only details that are different to Experiment 1 are provided.
Participants
Following ethical approval from the School of Psychology Ethics
Committee at the University of Hertfordshire, participants were
recruited through the email systems of that UK University. Six
hundred and sixty three participants entered the survey and 324
(122males and 202 females) completed all questionnaires and the
contingency learning task. Of the final sample, 165 (51%) self-
reported themselves to be white, the rest were of Asian, black or
of mixed origins. One hundred and sixteen (36%) participants
indicated that they did not identify with the dominant culture,
and 44 reported their place of birth to be a country often
associated with collectivist culture (China, India, Pakistan, Iran,
Malaysia etc.), the remainder were born in the UK and other
Western countries.
Participants were on average 25 years old (M = 25.36, SE =
0.50) with 16 years of full time education (M = 15.84, SE = 0.13).
Average scores on the Depression Anxiety Stress scales were
4.65, 3.33, and 5.46, respectively (SEs = 0.25, 0.20, 0.25) with
scores within the expected range. Scores on the MDQ ranged
from 0 to 13 (MMDQ = 4.8, SE = 0.19). Average horizontal
and vertical individualism scores were 9.67 (SE = 0.23) and
15.6 (SE = 0.30), respectively, whereas horizontal and vertical
collectivism scores were 10.79 (SE = 0.23) and 11.27 (SE = 0.26),
respectively.
Design
Participants were categorized on the VI and HC subscales (see
detailed correlational analysis in Table A3.2 in Supplementary
Material) and judgment of control ratings on the same
basis as the previous experiment. The median value for
control judgments was 13.5. Analyses were carried out as in
Experiment 1.
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FIGURE 4 | Action and context ratings as a function of low and high outcome density condition and low or high individualism groups. Error bars
correspond to the standard errors of the mean.
Measures
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS: Lovibond and
Lovibond, 1995)
The DASS is a 42-item self-report questionnaire that yields three
subscales measuring the symptoms of depression, anxiety and
stress. Each item is rated on a scale of 0–3 indicating the extent to
which that item had applied to the participant over the past week.
There are 14 items for each emotional state with a maximum
possible score of 42.
Results and Discussion
Hypothesis 1: Illusory Control Effects are Influenced
by Values
Participants’ judgments of control were analyzed as previously.
Gender did not interact with any of the other variables and was
excluded from the analysis. The data are shown in Figure 4 and
the ANOVA in Table 4.
Participantsmade higher ratings with higher levels of outcome
density, although the size of this effect depended on whether
the action or context was rated. Further analysis showed that
action judgments were sensitive to outcome density, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.18, but context ratings were not, p = 0.12, η2 =
0.008. Action ratings tended to be lower than context ratings but
the size of this effect depended on levels of individualism. Low
individualist participants attributed a similar degree of control
to the action and the context, p = 0.47, η2 = 0.002. However,
high individualist participants’ context ratings were significantly
higher than their action ratings, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.05.
Finally, there was a significant interaction between
individualism and collectivism. Overall, high individualists
tended to produce lower ratings (M = 10.34, SE = 3.15) than
low individualists (M = 22.22, SE = 3.33) but this was only
the case for high individualists who were also low collectivists,
p = 0.01, η2 = 0.02, and not those who were also high
collectivists, p = 0.71.
TABLE 4 | Analysis of variance for judgments of control in Experiment 2
(Hypothesis 1).
Source F η2 p
WITHIN SUBJECTS EFFECTS
Cue 10.56 0.032 0.001
Cue × VI 4.85 0.015 0.028
Cue × HC 1.43 0.004 0.233
Cue × VI × HC 0.22 0.001 0.640
Error(Cue) (2338.55)
Density 47.40 0.129 <0.001
Density × VI 0.26 0.001 0.608
Density × HC 0.15 <0.001 0.701
Density × VI × HC 1.11 0.003 0.293
Error (density) (1299.63)
Cue × Density 24.93 0.072 <0.001
Cue × Density × VI 0.70 0.002 0.403
Cue × Density × HC 0.27 0.001 0.607
Cue × Density × VI × HC 0.02 <0.001 0.876
Error (Cue × Density) (1146.14)
BETWEEN SUBJECTS EFFECTS
VI 2.92 0.009 0.088
HC 0.03 <0.001 0.855
VI × HC 4.82 0.015 0.029
Error (2935.21)
This was 2×2× (2×2) mixed factorial analysis of variance, with individualism (VI: low, high)
and collectivism (HC: low, high) entered as between subjects factors, and Cue (action,
context) and outcome density (low, high) entered as repeated measures factors. Mean
squared error values are shown in parentheses. Bold indicates significant effects. Degrees
of freedom = 1, 320.
Hypothesis 2a: Values Moderate the Relation
between Perceived Control and Symptoms
Depression (DASS-D) and MDQ scores are shown in Figure 5
with the ANOVA in Table 5.
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FIGURE 5 | Mean DASS-D (left) and MDQ scores (right) as a function of perceived control, individualist (VI) and collectivist (HC) values. Error bars
represent the standard error of the mean.
TABLE 5 | Analysis of variance on depression and bipolar scores in
Experiment 2 (Hypothesis 2a).
Dependent variable: Dependent variable:
DASS-D MDQ
Source F η2 p F η2 p
Control 7.31 0.023 0.007 4.66 0.015 0.032
VI 0.66 0.002 0.417 1.56 0.005 0.213
HC 6.49 0.020 0.011 0.60 0.002 0.440
Control × VI 0.34 0.001 0.561 0.88 0.003 0.349
Control × HC 5.91 0.018 0.016 1.83 0.006 0.177
VI × HC 0.50 0.002 0.480 0.51 0.002 0.478
Control × VI× HC 2.31 0.007 0.130 <0.01 <0.001 0.964
Error (19.60) (11.81)
These were 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVAs with individualist (VI: Low High), collectivist (HC: Low,
High) and Control (Low, High) as between subjects factors. Mean square error values are
shown in parentheses. Bold indicates significant effects. Degrees of freedom = 1, 316.
There were main effects of perceived control and collectivism
on depression scores, that were qualified by a control ×
collectivism interaction. Subsequent simple effects analyses
showed that for low collectivists only, low perceived control
participants showed significantly higher levels of depression
symptoms than participants who judged that they had high
levels of perceived control, F(1, 316) = 11.41, p = 0.001,
η2 = 0.04. For high collectivists, perceived control had no
effect on symptoms, F < 1, p = 0.8. The only variable
that had a reliable effect on MDQ scores was perceived
control. Participants reporting higher perceived control also
reported higher symptoms levels than low perceived control
groups.
Hypothesis 2b: Values Mediate the Relation between
Perceived Control and Symptoms
Two mediator analyses were carried out and the results of these
analyses are shown in Figure 6.
Judgments of control were negatively related to DASS
depression scores (a), such that high levels of perceived control
were related to low levels of depression and vice versa, β = −
0.01, p = 0.02, a finding consistent with previous research on
depressive realism. However, neither of the indirect effects were
reliable, VI: β = 0.02 [−0.003, 0.001], HC: β = −0.0001 [−0.003,
0.001]. In contrast to Experiment 1, HC scores did not mediate
the relation between judged control and depression.
Judgments of control did not show a direct relation withMDQ
scores (b), β = 0.02, p = 0.16. However, there was a completely
mediated relation between the two variables through VI scores,
VI: β = 0.005 [0.001, 0.01], an effect significant at the 95%
confidence level. Note that both sets of mediation analyses were
carried out both with and without anxiety included as a statistical
control and this did not change the pattern of results.
In summary, the findings of Experiment 2 showed that
values influenced contingency judgments. Like Experiment 1,
those who endorsed high individualist values showed greater
discrimination between action and context ratings than people
who did not endorse individualist values and this effect was
dependent on levels of outcome density. In addition, values
intervened in the relationship between perceived control and
mood disturbance. Those who did not endorse collectivist values
and perceived their lack of control reported higher levels of
depression symptoms, this was a moderator effect rather than a
mediated effect. Similar to Experiment 1, evidence showed that
individualist values mediated and did not moderate the control—
bipolar relation. Taken together, these findings suggest that values
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FIGURE 6 | Values as a mediator of the relationship between judgment of control and measures of (A) depression and (B) bi-polar symptoms,
controlling for anxiety. Significant direct pathways are indicated by solid (vs. broken) lines. Significant indirect pathways are emphasized with gray shading.
Ninety-five percentage confidence limits around the indirect effects are shown in brackets.
directly influence contingency learning and indirectly affect the
relation to symptoms.
However, the two different samples did not produce identical
results. While the mediating effect of individualist values in
relation to bipolar symptoms was consistent, the moderating
effect was not. Also the intervening effect of collectivist values was
not consistent across the two experiments, whether mediating
or moderating. These differences might be because the Irish
sample was smaller and less diverse (N = 127) than the UK
sample (N = 324), of which 36% said they did not identify
with the dominant, arguably individualist, culture, possibly
resulting in more consistency and similarity in values between
Irish participants. In the sample in which most participants
claimed an individualist background, individualist values had
a direct impact on illusory control and symptoms. High levels
were associated with stronger illusory control effects and higher
levels of bipolar symptoms. In the sample in which more
people were from a collectivist background, those who did not
tend to endorse collectivist values and perceived higher levels
of control self-reported the lowest symptoms of depression,
although the mediated effect was not evident. Participants with
highly collective values experienced higher levels of depression
irrespective of control levels. This suggests that collectivist values
consistent with lower control do not provide a simple protective
shield from depression as we envisaged. In both samples,
however, individualist values that were also consistent with
lower control (i.e., individualist values not endorsed) amplified
the positive predictive relation between control and bipolar
symptoms.
Experiment 3
Given the quasi-experimental and correlational nature of the
designs used in Experiments 1 and 2, it is likely that the
composition of the sample and variability in their values
will influence the precise effects observed. In addition, given
that these are essentially correlational findings, other unknown
variables could be responsible for the effects (Oyserman and Lee,
2008).
Therefore, in order to extend these results, we decided to run
an experimental study in order to manipulate experimentally
both values and perceived control in a random sample of
participants and measure the effects of this manipulation on
immediate emotional state. First, participants would be primed
with specific values (Hong et al., 2000; Gelfand et al., 2014)
relevant to control, individualism and collectivism—in this case
the value of winning vs. participation—and then be exposed to
conditions which usually produce low or high levels of perceived
control. Following this, momentarily experienced affect, both
negative and positive, would be measured because values might
exert their effect by enhancing or diminishing either type of
affective state.
Method
Only new information will be reported.
Participants
A total of 876 volunteers from the two universities in the
UK and the Republic of Ireland entered the online survey,
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of which 272 participants completed all measures (106 males
and 166 females). Of the final sample, 185 (68%) self-reported
as white, and 73 (26.8%) reported that they did not identify
with the dominant culture. On average, participants were 28
years old (SE = 0.73) and had received 16.07 years of
education (SE = 0.15). Average scores on the BDI and the
MDQ were 11.20 and 4.92 (SEBDI = 0.52; SEMDQ = 0.22),
respectively.
Design
This experiment used a 2 × 2 between subjects design, where
the first between subjects variable was primed values (winning,
participating) and the second between subjects variable was
outcome density (OD: low 0.25, high 0.75). Participants were
also categorized as low or high individualist as in the previous
experiments. Momentary levels of positive and negative affect
following completion of the contingency task were the dependent
variables. In addition, and in order to control for pre-existing
levels of affect, validated cutoff scores on the BDI (Beck et al.,
1961) were used to categorize participants as not depressed
or mildly depressed (<9 not depressed n = 119, >8 mildly
depressed n = 153) and entered into the analysis as a covariate
(note that while the proportion of the sample showing signs
of depression may seem high, this is consistent with previous
work using the BDI, e.g., Bumberry et al., 1978, 40/56 student
participants showed signs of depression; and the DASS, e.g.,
Bayram and Bilgel, 2008, 48% student participants showed signs
of depression). As in previous experiments, judgments of control
were also analyzed.
Measures
Positive and Negative Affect Scales (PANAS: Watson
et al., 1988)
The PANAS includes 20 words that describe aspects of positive
and negative affect (10 positive, 10 negative). Participants are
asked to indicate the extent to which they “feel this way right
now, that is, in the present moment,” using a 5-point Likert scale
which ranges from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely).
The possible range of scores is 10–50 for each subscale. This is
one of the most widely used scales to measure affect and has
received extensive validation (e.g., Watson et al., 1988; Crawford
and Henry, 2004).
Procedure
The procedure was the same as the previous experiment with the
addition of the priming instructions before the contingency task
(see Appendix 4 in Supplementary Material for details) and the
PANAS being completed afterwards.
Results and Discussion
Participants were primed to value winning or participating before
taking part in the contingency task and then rated their levels
of positive and negative affect. Pre-existing individualism was
included in all analyses as a between groups variable.
Hypothesis 1: Illusory Control Effects are Influenced
by Values
Judgments are shown in Figure 7 and with the ANOVA in
Table 6. This showed that context judgments were significantly
FIGURE 7 | Mean action and context ratings as a function of outcome density (OD), values prime (participate left, win right) and individualism (low top,
high bottom). Error bars correspond to the standard errors of the mean.
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TABLE 6 | Analysis of variance on judgments of control in Experiment 3
(Hypothesis 1).
Source F η2 p
WITHIN SUBJECTS EFFECTS
Cue 30.241 0.106 <0.001
Cue × OD 4.549 0.017 0.034
Cue × Prime 0.011 <0.001 0.918
Cue × VI 0.013 <0.001 0.910
Cue × Gender 3.873 0.015 0.050
Cue × OD × Prime 0.038 <0.001 0.846
Cue × OD × VI 4.317 0.017 0.039
Cue × OD × Gender 1.432 0.006 0.233
Cue × Prime× VI 0.534 0.002 0.466
Cue × Prime × Gender 0.025 <0.001 0.874
Cue × VI × Gender 2.509 0.010 0.114
Cue × OD × Prime × VI 0.056 <0.001 0.813
Cue × OD × Prime × Gender 0.726 0.003 0.395
Cue × OD × VI × Gender 1.746 0.007 0.188
Cue × Prime × VI × Gender 0.063 <0.001 0.802
Cue × OD × Prime × VI × Gender 0.312 0.001 0.577
Error (Cue) (1552.21)
BETWEEN SUBJECTS EFFECTS
OD 3.52 0.014 0.062
Prime 7.60 0.029 0.006
VI 0.001 <0.001 0.974
Gender 0.03 <0.001 0.87
OD × Prime 2.24 0.009 0.136
OD × VI 2.00 0.008 0.159
OD × Gender 5.40 0.021 0.021
Prime × VI 4.45 0.017 0.036
Prime × Gender 1.43 0.006 0.233
VI × Gender 0.03 <0.001 0.873
OD × Prime× VI 0.77 0.003 0.380
OD × Prime × Gender 0.32 0.001 0.571
OD × VI × Gender 0.02 <0.001 0.891
Prime × VI × Gender 0.95 0.004 0.330
OD × Prime × VI × Gender 1.03 0.004 0.312
Error (1404.68)
This was 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 × (2) mixed factorial analysis of variance, with prime (win,
participate), individualism (VI: low, high) and outcome density (OD: low, high) and gender
(male, female) entered as between subjects factors; cue (action, context) was entered as
a repeated measures factors. Mean squared error values are shown in parentheses. Bold
indicates significant effects. Degrees of freedom = 1, 256.
higher than action judgments but this main effect was qualified
by two further interactions: cue × outcome density and cue ×
outcome density × individualism. In addition, the values prime
effect depended on levels of individualism. Follow up analyses
showed that outcome density effects on action ratings were
significant for high (p = 0.003, η2 = 0.03) and low individualists
(p = 0.04, η2 = 0.02). Outcome density effects on context
ratings were not reliable for either group, all ps > 0.1. Only high
individualists showed the cue by density interaction, p = 0.002,
and not low individualists, p = 0.97. Finally, the values prime
had no influence on the ratings of high individualists (action and
context), p = 0.65, but low individualist participators produced
significantly higher ratings overall than winners, F(1, 256) =
12.10, p = 0.001,MSE = 702.338, η2 = 0.05.
Hypothesis 2a and 2b: Values Influence the Relation
between Control and Symptoms
Ratings of positive and negative affect taken following the
contingency task are shown in Figure 8, with the MANOVA
controlling for depression levels in Table 7.
Individualist values had a strong and consistent effect on both
positive and negative affect, with low individualists producing
higher affect scores on both dimensions, possibly indicatingmore
willingness to acknowledge or report their emotions. However,
the values prime independently increased levels of negative affect
but had no effect on positive scores. Item level analysis showed
that specific negative items were influenced by the prime. In
comparison to winners, participators were significantly more
upset (p = 0.05), scared (p = 0.05), hostile (p = 0.04),
jittery (p = 0.017), and afraid (p = 0.014), but not distressed
(p = 0.601), guilty (p = 0.324), irritable (p = 0.191), ashamed
(p = 0.340), or nervous (p = 0.602). The prime effect did not
depend on high or low levels of perceived control.
A supplementary mediation analysis was also carried out to
check that the indirect pathway from high OD judgments of
control through vertical individualism to MDQ scores observed
in Experiments 1 and 2 was replicated here, and it was, β = 0.003
[0.000, 0.010]. Moreover, indirect pathways were also evident to
negative affect scores, including jittery and afraid.
Taken together, the findings of Experiment 3 show that pre-
existing values, but not primed values, systematically influence
contingency learning, such that for high individualists judgments
of the action and context were affected by outcome density.
A similar pattern was observed in Experiments 1 and 2 but
was much clearer in Experiment 3, possibly due to the between
subjects nature of the design. In Experiment 3, however, the
influence of values on the outcome density effect on action ratings
was not reliable. This suggests that the overarching effect of pre-
existing values on perceived control is not the simple one we
predicted. Rather the effect of values is more complex and seems
to be exerted through its influence on context ratings.
Importantly, in the context of Experiments 1 and 2, we showed
experimentally that values influenced contingency learning and
subsequent responses to that situation. Participants primed to
value participation show higher levels of negative affect after the
taking part in the contingency judgment task. This trend was
focused on items related to anxiety as opposed to depressive
affect, which is consistent with heightened anxiety when there
is dissonance between task and values. In addition, and as
might have been expected, both the values prime and levels of
individualism influenced participants’ judgments of control in a
distinct manner. Individualism influenced the extent to which
outcome density determined discrimination between action and
context. Only participators’, but not winners’, judgments showed
systematic evidence of increasing with higher levels of outcome
density.
General Discussion
The findings reported here provide evidence for the influence
of values on contingency learning and the relation between
perceived control and symptoms of mood disturbance. Results
suggest that the effects of pre-existing values on perceived control
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FIGURE 8 | Mean affect scores as a function of perceived control, values prime and levels of individualism. Error bars correspond to the standard error of
the mean. “Pos” refers to positive affect, whereas “Neg” refers to negative affect.
TABLE 7 | Analysis of variance on post task affect scores in Experiment 3
(Hypothesis 2).
Source Dependent variable: F η2 p
affect
Depression group Positive 11.58 0.042 0.001
Negative 18.91 0.067 <0.001
OD Positive 2.09 0.008 0.150
Negative 0.22 0.001 0.637
Prime Positive 0.47 0.002 0.493
Negative 4.25 0.016 0.040
VI Positive 15.58 0.056 <0.001
Negative 14.10 0.051 <0.001
OD * Prime Positive 0.03 <0.001 0.865
Negative 0.55 0.002 0.457
OD * VI Positive 0.67 0.003 0.413
Negative 0.46 0.002 0.497
Prime * VI Positive 3.36 0.013 0.068
Negative 0.31 0.001 0.578
OD * Prime * VI Positive 0.40 0.002 0.528
Negative 0.06 <0.001 0.809
Error Positive (65.92)
Negative (32.42)
This was a multivariate analysis of variance with PANAS positive and negative scores
entered as the two dependent variables; perceived control, values prime and individualism
were entered between subjects independent variables. Depression group was included as
a covariate. Mean square error values are shown in parentheses. Bold indicates significant
effects. Degrees of freedom = 1, 263.
are transmitted through a consistent effect on perception of
context rather than directly as a simple bias toward valuing
control. In spite of this, we have also reported results here that
suggest that there is a bias toward valuing control at play and that
this bias influences mood disturbance and people’s immediate
responses to control tasks. These findings will be discussed in
turn below, before acknowledging the limitations of this work
and future directions.
Values Effects on Learning and Perceived Control
The consistent effect that we noted in these experiments is that
individualist values influence the relation between action and
context ratings and outcome density. Across three experiments,
high individualists discriminated strongly between their own
control and context control when there were few outcomes (low
outcome density). However, when many outcomes occurred,
participants rated their own control as equal to that of the
context. The same interaction was not strongly evident in low
individualists. We argue that associative learning theories (e.g.,
Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; Pearce, 1987) provide a useful
framework with which to explain these values effects because,
according to this perspective, context plays a key role in
contingency learning.
Associative learning theories can be categorized as involving
configural or elemental processing, with different implications
for how the context is processed. For example, the Rescorla–
Wagner model (RW: Rescorla andWagner, 1972) is an elemental
learningmodel because it holds that every stimulus, including the
context, becomes individually associated with the outcome when
it occurs. These individual associations are strengthened when
stimulus and outcome co-occur and are weakened when the
stimulus occurs alone. As there is a finite amount of associative
strength available for any given outcome, associative strength
is accrued to the extent that it is available. The ‘associative
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competition’ implied by the model means that the action-
outcome association will be weakened if the outcome gets
associated with the context, for example when there are high
levels of outcomes, and strengthened if it is not. This means that
the relation between action and context associations is highly
influenced by outcome density (Msetfi et al., 2005) in a manner
similar to the patterns of action and context ratings we have
observed in the high individualist participants. Thus, it could be
argued that high individualists are displaying some evidence of
elemental processing.
In contrast, configural associative learning models (e.g.,
Pearce, 1987) hold that learning involves acquiring holistic or
configural representations of stimuli, including the context, and
it is the configurations that enter into association with the
outcome rather than the individual elements. It follows then
that when stimuli are presented embedded in configurations
(i.e., action in context) any associative strength accrued by the
elements will generalize back to the configuration and vice
versa based on their similarity. So the context and outcome
become strongly associated to the extent that outcomes occur.
This associative strength then generalizes back to the action-
context-outcome association because of the similarity between
the action-context configuration and the context alone. This
means that the configural model does not predict an interaction
between outcome density and action/context in the manner we
have observed with high individualists. Rather the configural
model predicts that the difference between the action and context
associations will be constant over levels of outcome density.
Thus our low individualist data have more in common with a
configural learning process than an elemental one.
Figure 9 shows these predictions, using Rescorla–Wagner
(left) and Pearce model (right) simulations for which all learning
rate parameters were set to be equal (α sets the salience of the
action and the context, β sets the strength of the outcome).
Note that adjustment of the learning rate parameters does not
change the pattern of action-context discrimination predicted
by the models. Thus data in this study are consistent with
high individualists distinguishing between action and context in
a manner most consistent with elemental processing, whereas
low individualists seem to learn in a configural manner, in
which actions are tied to the strength of the context. Although
we also note that neither model predicts that this difference
should decrease in high outcome density conditions, it fact the
difference should increase. Overall, our findings are consistent
with the idea that pre-existing individualist values, but not
primed values, affect mode of processing, with high individualists
showing evidence of elemental learning and low individualists’
data beingmore suggestive of configural learning. In other words,
learning processes are not absolute, either elemental or configural
(Williams et al., 1994; Melchers et al., 2008; Byrom and Murphy,
2014).
This interpretation of the data is broadly in line with
other evidence that cultural perspectives and values influence
modes of information processing (e.g., Nisbett et al., 2001;
Nisbett and Miyamoto, 2005). For example, when Chinese
participants were exposed to Rorschach stimuli, they responded
in a manner consistent with the perception of whole patterns,
whereas American Chinese participants’ responses focused
on the components of the stimulus (Abel and Hsu, 1949).
Thus, cross-cultural research has also suggested differences in
perception between collectivist and individualist people, in terms
of holistic processing of groups of stimuli vs. object focused
processing of individual stimuli within groups (Nisbett et al.,
2001; Nisbett and Miyamoto, 2005; Park and Huang, 2010). In
other words, collectivist values are linked to configural processing
and individualistic values to elemental processing.
FIGURE 9 | Predictions of the Rescorla–Wagner (left panel) and Pearce models (right panel) for the acquisition over time and learning blocks of Action
and Context associations (solid and broken lines) in low and high outcome density conditions (square and circle symbols). Acquisition functions were
simulated over 10 learning blocks using a value of 0.2 for the α, β1, and β0 parameters.
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It is important to note, however, that we only found evidence
of an effect of individualist values on contingency learning, based
on highly endorsing or being ambivalent about individualistic
values. Stronger endorsement of collectivist values did not
produce similar effects to weak endorsement of individualistic
values. This is not entirely surprising given that the sample
was recruited from a European, predominantly individualistic,
culture. However, a contribution of this paper is to show that
while values effects on information processing might have been
thought of as a cross cultural phenomenon they are also evident
in this relatively homogenous sample recruited from within
European culture. Another novel contribution of this work is to
demonstrate that associative learning theory can explain some of
these effects. This is consistent with the idea that stimuli can be
coded flexibly and that learning processes are not absolute, either
elemental or configural (Williams et al., 1994; Melchers et al.,
2008; Byrom and Murphy, 2014).
Values Influence the Relation between Control
and Symptoms
Values and perceived control were associated with signs of mood
disturbance. These findings were not exactly as expected. For
example, we anticipated that values would affect the relation
between judgments of control and depressed mood because of
the psychological value placed on control (Betancourt and Lopez,
1993) and because the consequences of perceived lack of control
have consistently been related to depression (Seligman, 1975).
We tested both (a) moderation and (b) mediation hypotheses
in order to test (a) for a simple qualitative difference between
value groups, and, given that intervening mediator variables can
completely suppress evidence of a direct effect, to test (b) whether
values indirectly influenced the control to symptom relation.
The moderating effect of collectivist values on depression was
only evident in the second, larger, relatively diverse, sample in
which a depression measure was used that was intended to
distinguish between anxiety and stress. Low levels of perceived
control were associated with higher levels of depressed mood but
only in those who did not endorse collectivist values. Evidence
for the mediating effect of collectivist values on depression was
only seen in the smaller less diverse sample in Experiment 1.
Thus we can only conclude that any intervening effect of values
on depression symptoms was very much influenced by sample
composition.
However, onemediated pathwaywas strongly and consistently
evident in all experiments and involved the euphoric symptoms
of bipolar disorder as opposed to depression. Higher levels of
perceived control (when people had none) were predictive of
higher levels of such symptoms in a pathway through lower
levels of vertical individualism. People reporting high perceived
control and lower levels of vertical individualism also reported
higher levels of mood disturbing symptoms related specifically to
mania or elation. (Note that the measure used here, the MDQ,
includes only items on the frequency of manic aspects of bi-polar
symptoms over the long term and does not include items on low
or depressive symptoms). This relationship was significant both
when anxiety was controlled in the analysis and when it was not.
These mediated pathways are interesting because they suggest
that if control is perceived to be high, and low value is placed
on it, this could lead to psychological disturbance.
As we were interested in the processes through which such
effects might occur, it was also important to test for similar
effects experimentally. Priming the value of participation in
comparison to winning produced higher levels of negative affect,
particularly anxiety, after the contingency task irrespective of
the level of control perceived. While this negative influence of
priming was not focused in high illusory control conditions
only, we did find that control judgments in the same conditions
indirectly predicted both bipolar symptoms and negative affect
through the vertical individualism pathway. Taken together,
these correlational and experimental findings provide strong
support for the role of perceived control and cultural values in
mood disturbance. It could also be argued that whereas primed
values can exert a direct effect on the emotional response to a
given task, it might be that values embedded in the task itself
(e.g., Wigfield et al., 2004), rather than the degree of perceived
control per se, create dissonance with primed values and thus
anxiety. Therefore, an anxious emotional response to value-laden
situations might be one pathway through which symptoms of
mood disturbance eventually develop.
A link between perceived control and bipolar symptoms
is not unanticipated. For example, Langer speculated that
misattribution of causal effectiveness to the self, the so-called
illusion of control could be an etiological factor in manic
symptoms (Langer, 1975). The new finding here is that this link
is completely mediated by cultural values, specifically vertical
individualism. People who score highly in vertical individualism
subscale endorse items related to the importance of winning and
competitiveness, as well as social status comparisons related to
being seen to do better than others and feeling quite anxious
when the performance of others is evaluated as better than
one’s own (Triandis and Gelfand, 1998). People with low scores
disagree with these values. Thus we found that a person who
feels highly “in control” but disagrees with these competition
and status values is more likely to be anxious and to experience
euphoric mood disturbance. This would be consistent with an
individual’s perspective along the lines of, “I have high levels of
control, and I don’t care about success and what people think.”
This evidence is consistent with the idea that “having control”
is differentially desirable in terms of psychological wellbeing
depending on particular cultural values.
Whilst this new finding does partially support our original
hypotheses that feeling “in control” is not always a hallmark
of being mentally healthy (see also Cheng et al., 2013), this
study does not involve a clear contrast between individualist
vs. collectivist values. This is because in these experiments,
those who did not agree with [vertical] individualist values did
not necessarily endorse collectivist values either. This may be
partly because we chose to identify values in participants living
within one cultural setting. This decision was based on the idea
that hard and fast cultural distinctions between individualist
and collectivist perspectives, while being very useful, are not
absolute (Green et al., 2005). As many scholars have pointed
out, every Western country or every Asian country will not have
the same precise pattern of cultural values (e.g., Triandis and
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Gelfand, 1998). Our data supported that view. Two particular
subscales of the individualism—collectivism questionnaire, but
not all four, distinguished our participants. These were vertical
individualism and horizontal collectivism, however, it was
vertical individualism values that were endorsed most strongly
by our samples in comparison to all other values. It was also
vertical individualist values that were linked to different patterns
of learning about control.
Taken together, these findings suggest that the psychological
value ascribed to “having control” by theorists, researchers, and
practitioners should not be considered to be a universal but as a
function of the values that an individual does or does not hold,
their own desired and perceived level of control, the specific
situation in which they find themselves and the values relevant to
that situation. In this study, all of these factors influenced mood
and affective disturbance to some degree.
Limitations
This study has contributed to our understanding of values
effects on contingency learning and links between perceived
control and mood disturbance. However, there are limitations
that require acknowledgment. We used the internet as a means
of data collection. There were several reasons for choosing this
form of data collection. Firstly, large samples were important
to test hypotheses with adequate power. Moreover, internet data
collection for larger samples is a cost effective and timely method.
While these goals were achieved, a well acknowledged drawback
of Internet data collection is high dropout rates. People can
stop participating at any time in online experiments, and longer
studies result in higher dropout levels (Hoerger, 2010). Whilst
this is ethically desirable because, in contrast to a laboratory
experiment, there is less social pressure to continue participation,
reduced statistical power and possibly a biased final sample can
result (Rogler, 1999; Pilkington and Msetfi, 2012). In this series
of experiments, we anticipated high dropout rates due to the
required duration of participation (the contingency judgment
section of the experiment alone lasted a minimum of 5-min).
However, despite this, the nature of the samples did not appear
to have been compromised because data were consistent with
patterns of learning reported from data collected for many years
in the laboratory (e.g., Blanco et al., 2011, 2012).
Conclusions
We set out to test whether values affect learning about control.
Specifically, we tested whether values would affect illusory control
and the relations between perceived control and symptoms.
Both sets of hypotheses found partial support. There was
evidence that values influenced the basic processes involved in
contingency learning and perceived control via different modes
of processing environmental or contextual stimuli. Associative
learning theories that invoke elemental and configural processing
can explain these findings. We also found that the perception of
“being in control” when you are not, is not universally predictive
of good psychological wellbeing and that the value ascribed
to control is particularly important in relation to the euphoric
symptoms of bipolar disorder. Thus researchers, and indeed
clinicians, interested in perceived control, must acknowledge
the part that values play in the complex relationship between
perceived control and psychopathology.
Supplementary Material
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found
online at: http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.
2015.01430
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